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Lockert v. Breedlove: The North Carolina Supreme Court
Rejects the Minimum Contacts Analysis Under the "Transient
Rule" of Jurisdiction
If Pennoyer v. Neff I is a first-year law student's nightmare, it is no less
challenging to practicing attorneys who must still contend with the decision's
broad assertions of state sovereignty and its far-reaching effect oil personal juris-
diction. The Pennoyer Court deemed service of process on nonresident defend-
ants in the forum state sufficient to establish personal jurisidiction. 2 Although
one commentator has since labeled this "transient rule" of jurisdiction a
"pseudo-medieval" formula, 3 it is alive and well in North Carolina. In Lockert
v. Breedlove4 the North Carolina Supreme Court addressed whether the tran-
sient rule of jurisidiction was abolished or at least subject to the minimum con-
tacts analysis after two post-Pennoyer decisions, International Shoe Co. v.
Washington 5 and Shaffer v. Heitner.6 The Lockert court held that the rule was
neither abolished nor subject to the minimum contacts test in cases in which
"the defendant is personally served while present within the forum state."' 7
This Note examines the Lockert decision in light of the history of the tran-
sient rule of jurisdiction, judicial interpretations of the purpose and scope of the
rule, and recent challenges to its validity. The Note considers the probable im-
pact of the decision and concludes that Lockert represents a misreading of the
constitutional requirement of minimum contacts introduced in International
Shoe and extended in Shaffer. As such, the Lockert decision undermines the due
process rights of nonresident defendants.
Plaintiff Charles R. Lockert, a resident of Rowan County, North Carolina,
brought suit in North Carolina to recover the balance due on a promissory note
signed by nonresident defendants Billie E. Breedlove and Abed Zakaria.8
Zakaria was never located or served for purposes of this action. On January 31,
1986, Breedlove was served with a copy of the summons and complaint while in
Salisbury, North Carolina. 9 Breedlove filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to
1. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
2. The Pennoyer Court stated "'[w]here a party is within a territory, he may justly be sub-
jected to its process, and bound personally by the judgment pronounced on such process against
him.'" Id. at 724 (quoting Picquet v. Swan, 19 F. Cas. 609, 612 (C.C.D. Mass. 1828) (No. 11,134));
see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 28 (1971) ("A state has power to exer-
cise judicial jurisdiction over an individual who is present within its territory, whether permanently
or temporarily.").
3. Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and Forum
Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289, 314 (1956). Ehrenzweig argues, "The American transient rule must
... be said to lack precedent in the English tradition of the common law as to both of its alleged
sources-the doctrine of physical power and the concept of the transitory action." Id. at 303.
4. 321 N.C. 66, 361 S.E.2d 581 (1987).
5. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
6. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
7. Lockert, 321 N.C. at 69, 361 S.E.2d at 583.
8. Id. at 67, 361 S.E.2d at 582.
9. Id. Defendant Breedlove was served pursuant to N.C. R. Civ. P. 401).
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Rule 12(b)(2) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure and the due pro-
cess clause of the fourteenth amendment.' 0 She alleged lack of in personam
jurisdiction "because she did not have sufficient minimum contacts with the
State of North Carolina."11 The trial court denied Breedlove's motion to dis-
miss, and the North Carolina Court of Appeals, without a written opinion, af-
firmed the trial court's order.12 Breedlove appealed to the North Carolina
Supreme Court and maintained that a state's exercise of in personam jurisdiction
over a nonresident is subject to the International Shoe requirement that "certain
'minimum contacts'. . . exist between the nonresident defendant and the forum
state." 13 Breedlove argued that "mere service of process within the forum state
neither complies with nor supplants the constitutional requirement of minimum
contacts."14
Breedlove's contention that "presence of a person in the forum state is not
sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon its courts" presented the North Carolina
Supreme Court with an issue of first impression.' 5 The court noted that Breed-
love was duly served pursuant to the North Carolina long-arm statute.16 The
court acknowledged, but rejected, decisions of other jurisdictions that made
"sweeping pronouncements to the effect that minimum contacts analysis is re-
quired in all cases in which the defendant is a nonresident of the forum state." 17
Instead, the court relied on decisions which have held "the minimum contacts
10. Lockert, 321 N.C. at 67, 361 S.E.2d at 582; N.C. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). The fourteenth
amendment reads in part:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
11. Lockert, 321 N.C. at 67, 361 S.E.2d at 582. Breedlove did not argue that "process or man-
ner of service was insufficient or that her presence in the state was procured by trick, fraud or
deceit." Id.
12. Lockert v. Breedlove, 84 N.C. App. 701, 354 S.E.2d 34 (1987). The decision by the North
Carolina Court of Appeals was reported without published opinion.
13. Lockert, 321 N.C. at 68, 361 S.E.2d at 583. Breedlove appealed pursuant to N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 7A-30(l) (1986).
14. Lockert, 321 N.C. at 68, 361 S.E.2d at 583.
15. Id The supreme court distinguished Lockert from cases in which it "has consistently ap-
plied the minimum contacts analysis articulated in International Shoe to cases in which nonresident
defendants were served with process outside the forum state." Id.; see, eg., Tom Togs, Inc. v. Ben
Elias Indus. Corp., 318 N.C. 361, 365, 348 S.E.2d 782, 786 (1986) (requiring minimum contacts
between non-resident defendant, served outside state, and forum); United Buying Group, Inc. v.
Coleman, 296 N.C. 510, 515, 251 S.E.2d 610, 614 (1979) (applying minimum contacts to determine
validity of in personam jurisdiction over non-resident defendant served with process outside of
forum).
16. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-75.4(1)(a) (1983). The North Carolina long-arm statute grants in
personam jurisdiction over persons served in an action pursuant to Rule 40) or 40 1) of the North
Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure and "[i]n any action.., in which a claim is asserted against a party
who when service of process is made upon such party [i]s a natural person present within this State
." Id.
17. Lockert, 321 N.C. at 68, 361 S.E.2d at 583; see Nehemiah v. Athletics Congress, 765 F.2d
42, 46 (3d Cir. 1985); Waffenschmidt v. Mackay, 763 F.2d 711, 721 (5th Cir. 1985), cerL denied sub
nom. Waffenschmidt v. First Nat'l Bank, 474 U.S. 1056 (1986); Harold M. Pitman Co. v. Typecraft
Software Ltd., 626 F. Supp. 305, 312 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Mohler v. Dorado Wings, Inc., 675 S.W.2d




test is inapplicable to cases in which the defendant is personally served within
the forum state."18 The court affirmed the lower courts' decisions and held that
"the rule continues to be that personal service on a nonresident party, at a time
when that party is present in the forum state, suffices in and of itself to confer
personal jurisdiction over that party." 19 The court defended its conclusion on
two grounds.
First, the court noted the United States Supreme Court's recognition in
Pennoyer that "eminent jurists long had agreed that personal jurisdiction could
be acquired solely by service of process on the defendant in the forum state."' 20
The Supreme Court's decisions in International Shoe and Shaffer, the court as-
serted, did not change the transient rule of jurisdiction.21 The court acknowl-
edged doubts expressed by some commentators subsequent to these decisions "as
to whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction over nonresidents based solely
on service of process upon them within the forum state was still proper." 22 The
court, however, contended that International Shoe and its progeny "did not
sound the death knell for the transient rule ofjurisdiction; rather, these cases set
out an alternative means of establishing personal jurisdiction when the defendant
is 'not present within the territory of the forum.' ",23 The court concluded:
18. Lockert, 321 N.C. at 69, 361 S.E,2d at 583; see Amusement Equipment, Inc. v. Mordelt,
779 F.2d 264, 270 (5th Cir. 1985); Opert v. Schmid, 535 F. Supp. 591, 593-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1982);
Aluminal Indus. v. Newtown Commercial Assocs., 89 F.R.D. 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Hutto v.
Plagens 254 Ga. 512, 513, 330 S.E.2d 341, 342-43 (1985); Humphrey v. Langford, 246 Ga. 732, 733,
273 S.E.2d 22, 23 (1980); In re Marriage of Pridemore, 146 Ill. App. 3d 990, 992, 497 N.E.2d 818,
820 (1986). For a discussion of this approach, see infra notes 61-79 and accompanying text.
19. Lockert, 321 N.C. at 72, 361 S.E.2d at 585.
20. Id. at 69, 361 S.E.2d at 583. In Pennoyer the Court stated:
[1]t is laid down by jurists, as an elementary principle, that the laws of one State have no
operation outside of its territory, except so far as is allowed by comity; and that no tribunal
established by it can extend its process beyond that territory so as to subject either persons
or property to its decisions.
Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722. For a discussion of Pennoyer, see infra notes 29-33 and accompanying
text.
21. Lockert, 321 N.C. at 70, 361 S.E.2d at 584.
22. Id. at 69, 361 S.E.2d at 584; see Bernstine, Shaffer v. Heitner: A Death Warrant for the
Transient Rule of In Personam Jurisdiction?, 25 VILL. L. REv. 38,40 (1979-80); Glen, An Analysis of
"Mere Presence" and Other Traditional Bases of Jurisdiction, 45 BROOKLYN L. REv. 607, 613-14
(1979); Vernon, State-Court Jurisdiction: A Preliminary Inquiry into the Impact of Shaffer v. Heit-
ner, 63 IowA L. REv. 997, 1021 (1978); von Meren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate" A
Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1121, 1178-79 (1966). For discussions of the evolution of
territorial jurisdiction, see Abrams & Dimond, Toward a Constitutional Framework for the Control
of State Jurisdiction, 69 MINN. L. REv. 75, 77-83 (1984); Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due
Process Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction, 1980 Sup. Cr. REv. 77; Clermont, Restating Territo-
rial Jurisdiction and Venue for State and Federal Courts, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 411, 413-429 (1981);
Drobak, The Federalism Theme in Personal Jurisdiction, 68 IowA L. REv. 1015, 1019-33, 1065-66
(1983); Ehrenzweig, From State Jurisdiction to Interstate Venue, 50 OR. L. REv. 103, 103-107
(1971); Leflar, The Converging Limits of State Jurisdictional Powers, 9 J. PUB. L. 282, 282-92 (1960);
Redish, Due Process, Federalism, and Personal Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Evaluation, 75 Nw. U.L.
REv. 1112, 1115-20 (1981); Weisburd, Territorial Authority and Personal Jurisdiction, 63 WASH.
U.L.Q. 377, 377-83 (1985).
23. Lockert, 321 N.C. at 70, 361 S.E.2d at 584 (quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316)
(emphasis added). The court referred to language in International Shoe: "'[D]ue process requires
only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the
territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it ....... Lockert, 321 N.C. at 70, 361
S.E.2d at 584 (quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316).
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Our research reveals no instance in which the Supreme Court has ap-
plied the "minimum contacts" requirement of International Shoe in a
case in which the defendant was personally served while in the forum
state... [and neither] International Shoe nor its progeny have ques-
tioned the constitutionality of a state's exercise of personal jurisdiction
based solely on personal service within its borders. 24
As a second rationale for upholding the transient rule, the Lockert court
asserted that due process requirements-the defendant must have adequate no-
tice of the suit and maintenance of the suit must be fair and just25-are met
under the transient rule of jurisdiction. The court suggested adequate notice is
met by actual service, and concluded that maintenance of the suit in the state in
which the defendant is served "is entirely fair and just."'26 The court reasoned
that a nonresident visiting another state "'assume[s] some risk that the State
will exercise its power over [her].' "27 Emphasizing that "the venue is where the
nonresident defendant is of [her] own volition and is served," the court held that
jurisdiction over defendant was proper.28
Although the United States Supreme Court has not specifically addressed
whether a minimum contacts analysis applies when nonresidents are personally
served in the forum state, three significant Supreme Court decisions involving
personal jurisdiction provide the conceptual framework for this debate. In Pen-
noyer v. Neff29 the Court addressed whether in rem jurisdiction could be ac-
quired by the attachment of defendant's property in the forum state.30 The
Court's holding-that such a procedure was sufficient to obtain jurisdiction-
relied on Justice McLean's statement that "'j]urisdiction is acquired in one of
two modes: first, as against the person of the defendant, by the service of pro-
cess; or, secondly, by a procedure against the property of the defendant within
24. Lockert, 321 N.C. at 71, 361 S.E.2d at 584-85. The court noted "the Supreme Court cases
applying the International Shoe minimum contacts analysis have involved substituted process within
the state, service of process outside of the state, or both." Id. at 70, 361 S.E.2d at 584; see, e.g.,
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 469 (1985) (service outside state; defendants ap-
peared specially); Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 412 (1984) (non-
resident defendants served outside state and appeared specially); Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 784
(1984) (service by mail outside state; defendants appeared specially); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.
v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 288 (1980) (service outside state-defendants appeared specially); Han-
son v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 242 (1958) (nonresident defendants served by mail); McGee v. Inter-
national Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 221 (1957) (process served by mail at defendant's out-of-state
place of business).
25. Lockert, 321 N.C. at 71, 361 S.E.2d at 585; see International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316; Mullane
v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1950).
26. Lockert, 321 N.C. at 71, 361 S.E.2d at 585.
27. Id. at 71, 361 S.E.2d at 585 (quoting Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 218 (Stevens, J., concurring)).
Justice Stevens, in his concurring opinion in Shaffer, argued that a nonresident assumes certain risks
in entering a state: "If I visit another State... I knowingly assume some risk that the State will
exercise its power over my property or my person while there. My contact with the State, though
minimal, gives rise to predictable risks." 433 U.S. at 218 (Stevens, J. concurring). Thus, Stevens
implied that a defendant's single visit to the forum state can establish the requisite minimum con-
tacts for the exercise of personal jurisdiction.
28. Lockert, 321 N.C. at 71-72, 361 S.E.2d at 585.
29. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
30. Id. at 720.
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the jurisdiction of the court.' ",31 The Pennoyer Court found further support for
this view of jurisdiction under the de facto powers of the states: "every State
possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property
within its territory." 32 Thus, despite the Court's focus in Pennoyer on in rem
jurisdiction, the Court approved the transient rule of jurisdiction that service on
a nonresident defendant present within the forum state was sufficient for in per-
sonam jurisdiction.33
In 1945 the Supreme Court addressed whether personal jurisdiction could
be exercised over persons outside the forum state. International Shoe v. Wash-
ington 34 involved service of process on a Delaware corporation employing sales-
men in the State of Washington.35 The Court announced that "due process
requires ... [that the non-resident defendant] have certain minimum contacts
with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' "36 Because the corpora-
tion's activities in the forum state were regular and the corporation received the
benefits and protection of the laws of the forum state, the Court found sufficient
minimum contacts for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the corpora-
tion.37 Hence, the Court in International Shoe moved beyond Pennoyer's tradi-
tional sovereignty approach to personal jurisidiction and focused, in its
minimum contacts test, on the due process requirements necessary for a state's
exercise of in personam jurisdiction.
Subsequently, in Shaffer v. Heitner38 the Court extended the minimum con-
tacts analysis to quasi in rem actions. 39 In Shaffer plaintiff filed a shareholders'
derivative suit in Delaware and moved for sequestration of the nonresident de-
fendants' stock. 4° The Court rejected the Pennoyer rule for in rem jurisdiction
applied by the lower courts in this case and addressed the nonresident defend-
ants' argument that their contacts with the forum state were insufficient to sub-
ject them to the state court's jurisidiction. 41 The Court held International Shoe
controlled in rem, quasi in rem, and in personam jurisdiction over nonresident
defendants: "[The] continued acceptance [of the Pennoyer rule] would serve
only to allow state-court jurisdiction that is fundamentally unfair to the defend-
31. Id. at 724 (quuting Boswell's Lessee v. Otis, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 336, 348 (1850)).
32. Id. at 722.
33. Id. at 724. One commentator noted the Pennoyer "territorial power theory" allowed exer-
cise of jurisdiction over transient nonresident defendants in a variety of situations. See Bernstine,
supra note 22, at 44; see, e.g., Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442, 443 (E.D. Ark. 1959) (service
of defendant in plane over forum state valid); Fitzhugh v. Reid, 252 F. 234, 235 (E.D. Ark. 1918)
(defendant served while in forum state for medical treatment); Fisher, Brown & Co. v. Fielding, 67
Conn. 91, 105-06, 34 A. 714, 715 (1895) (service of defendant in forum state for a few hours on
business valid under transient rule of jurisidiction); Peabody v. Hamilton, 106 Mass. 217, 217-18
(1870) (service of process on defendant on board steamer in Boston harbor sufficient).
34. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
35. Id. at 313-14.
36. Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
37. Id. at 320.
38. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
39. Id. at 212.
40. Id. at 189.
41. Id. at 195-96.
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ant. We therefore conclude that all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be
evaluated according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its prog-
eny." 4 2 Whether Shaffer should be read broadly as a mandate for minimum
contacts in all exercises of state jurisdiction remains unclear,43 but it at least
"potentially abolishes the traditional [Pennoyer] distinctions between in per-
sonata, in rem, and quasi in rem jurisdiction in favor of the minimum contacts
approach." 44
Although the Supreme Court has not commented on the status of the tran-
sient rule of jurisdiction after International Shoe and Shaffer, federal and state
courts have grappled with the issue and relied largely on their respective inter-
pretations of the Pennoyer-International Shoe-Shaffer trilogy.4 5 Several jurisdic-
tions require the minimum contacts test in all state exercises ofjurisdiction. 46 In
Waffenschmidt v. Mackay,47 for example, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit announced a two-part test for determining the validity of in
personam jurisdiction exercised by the forum state over nonresidents who had
aided and abetted defendant's violation of a court injunction, but who were not
parties to the suit. Validity of jurisdiction was to be determined, "first, through
an examination of the inherent powers of a court, and second, through tradi-
tional in personam jurisdiction analysis under International Shoe."'48 Applying
the first prong of the test, the court determined that the "traditional notions of
due process [were] not offended" because foreseeability, relative convenience of
the parties, and special interest of the forum court were met. 49 Without debate,
the court assumed that International Shoe and its progeny mandated a second
inquiry: a minimum contacts analysis to determine the propriety of jurisdiction
in this instance.50 In the court's view, International Shoe "expanded [the Pen-
42. Id. at 212 (emphasis added).
43. See 4 C. WRIrT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1064 n.15 (1987)
("The Supreme Court's emphasis on minimum contacts in [Shaffer v. Heitner] can be read to cast
doubt on the continuing validity of the transient rule.").
44. Bernstine, supra note 22, at 53.
45. See cases cited supra notes 17-18. Pre-Shaffer cases generally upheld the transient rule of
jurisdiction without applying a minimum contacts analysis. See, eg., Donald Manter Co. v. Davis,
543 F.2d 419, 420 (1st Cir. 1976). In Manter the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit held that service on nonresident defendant in the forum state on unrelated business was
sufficient. The court stated that International Shoe and its progeny dealt with "expanding jurisdic-
tion beyond traditional limits, not with contracting it." Id.
46. See cases cited supra note 17. In Mohler v. Dorado Wings, Inc., 675 S.W.2d 404 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1984), the Court of Appeals of Kentucky presumed, without even addressing the issue, that
minimum contacts were required for the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction. Id. at 405. An agent of
defendant, an airline company with neither assets nor employees in the forum state, was served with
process in the forum state. Id. The court acknowledged that the long-arm statute "reach[ed] to the
full constitutional limits of due process in entertaining jurisdiction over non-resident defendants,"
but added that the determination of the limits of due process is made by applying the minimum
contacts test of International Shoe. Id.
47. 763 F.2d 711 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied sub nom. Waffenschmidt v. First Nat'l Bank of
Vernon, 474 U.S. 1056 (1986).
48. Id. at 721.
49. Id. at 722. That the jurisdictional question in this case involved nonparties did not change
the nature of the minimum contacts analysis applied by the appellate court from the analysis applied
to nonresident parties to a suit.
50. Id. at 717.
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noyer 'presence' requirement] by permitting jurisdiction if the person had suffi-
cient minimum contacts ...." ,51 The court found authority for the service of
process on nonresidents in the forum state in the state's long-arm statute.52 Af-
ter finding the requisite grant of power, the court examined the nature and ex-
tent of the nonresidents' acts in the forum state and held the conduct of aiding
and abetting established sufficient minimum contacts to satisfy due process
requirements 53
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
looked to Shaffer for authority that "[p]ersonal service within the jurisdiction is
not the litmus test for proper in personam jurisdiction."' 54 The court in Harold
M. Pitman Co. v. Typecraft Software LtcL 55 construed the Shaffer Court's "pref-
erence for 'assessing assertions of jurisdiction by a single standard' " as requiring
"unequivocally" a minimum contacts test for "all assertions of state-court juris-
diction." 56 The nonresident defendant in Pitman was served in the forum state
at a trade exhibition which, he argued, was his only connection with the forum
state and did not constitute sufficient minimum contacts for the exercise of per-
sonal jurisdiction over him.57 The court stated that plaintiff had the burden to
"establish the existence of jurisdiction under [state] law, and ... that exercise of
jurisdiction over the defendant [would] not offend the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment." 58 Noting that Shaffer announced " 'the collapse of the
in personam wing of Pennoyer,' "59 the Pitman court held defendant's "transient
presence... fail[ed] to amount to the minimum contacts required under the due
process clause." 6
In contrast, other jurisdictions have steadfastly adhered to the notion that
"[p]hysical presence is the traditional basis of judicial jurisdiction" and by itself
justifies the transient jurisdiction theory.61 One of the earliest decisions dis-
cussed the rule of transient jurisdiction shortly after Shaffer had imposed a
51. Id. at 722.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 722-23.
54. Harold M. Pitman Co. v. Typecraft Software Ltd., 626 F. Supp. 305, 312 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
55. 626 F. Supp. 305 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
56. Id. at 312 (quoting Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 212).
57. Id. at 307. The Pitman court relied on two cases. In Nehemiah v. Athletics Congress of the
U.S.A., 765 F.2d 42 (3rd Cir. 1985), the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that "due
process considerations preclude effecting personal jurisdiction over an unincorporated association
merely by in-state service on its agent." Id. at 46. The court in Nehemiah noted, but did not hold,
that Shaffer probably extends to individuals served with process in the forum state as well. Id. at 46-
47. Pitman also discussed Amusement Equip., Inc. v. Mordelt, 595 F. Supp. 125 (E.D. La. 1984),
rev'd, 779 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1985), in which the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana held that "[t]he due process clause limits the state's jurisdictional reach" under both long-
arm and transient jurisdiction. Id. at 128. However, this ruling was subsequently overturned by
Amusement Equip., Inc. v. Mordelt, 779 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1985), discussed infra notes 68-74 and
accompanying text.
58. Id. at 308.
59. Id. at 312 (quoting Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 205).
60. Id. at 314. The court further held that "under Shaffer, mere service of process upon a
defendant transiently present in the jurisdiction does not vest a state with personal jurisdiction over
the defendant." Id. at 312.
61. Oxmans' Erwin Meat Co. v. Blacketer, 86 Wis. 2d 683, 687, 273 N.W.2d 285, 286 (1979);
see supra note 18.
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"minimum contacts" requirement on personal service of a nonresident in the
forum state.62 In Oxmans'Erwin Meat Co. v. Blacketer63 the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin upheld jurisdiction over a nonresident officer of a corporation who
was personally served in Wisconsin." The court relied on pre-Shaffer cases6s in
support of its application of transient jurisdiction and added, "[n]either Interna-
tional Shoe nor its progeny, including the recent case ofShaffer... addresses the
issue of the constitutionality of [the transient rule of jurisdiction]." 66 Signifi-
cantly, however, the court continued, "[a]lthough we do not today hold the
'minimum contacts' rule... to be applicable .... we conclude that [defendant's]
activities within [the forum state] fulfilled the 'minimum contacts'
requirement." 67
Similarly, in Amusement Equipment, In. v. Mordelt68 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held "the rule of transient jurisdiction has
life left in it yet."' 69 Plaintiff in Mordelt served the nonresident defendant at a
business convention both were attending in the forum state.70 The court of ap-
peals noted these facts "plunged... [the court] into the purgatory of transient
jurisdiction" but nevertheless held it was "unwilling... to ferry this rule across
the river Styx."' 71 The court observed the cases in which the Supreme Court
required the minimum contacts analysis involved either substituted process
within the forum state or service of process outside the state.72 By negative
implication, the court concluded that minimum contacts was not required in
cases involving service on nonresident defendants within the forum state and
added, "When the defendant is present within the forum state, notice of the suit
through proper service of process is all the process to which he is due." 73 Fur-
ther, the court attempted to define the competing roles of state sovereignty and
due process limitations on that power:
That the requirement of personal jurisdiction rests in all cases on the
due process clause does not weaken the proposition that the exercise of
jurisdiction, as distinguished from its limitation, is a sovereign act. If
there is anything that characterizes sovereignty, it is the state's domin-
62. Blacketer, 86 Wis. 2d at 687-88, 273 N.W.2d at 287.
63. 86 Wis. 2d 683, 273 N.W.2d 285 (1979).
64. Id. at 686, 273 N.W.2d at 286.
65. See id. at 687 n.3, 273 N.W.2d at 287 n.3. The court said, "[w]e have found only two cases
in which this issue is directly addressed. In both the validity of 'transient' jurisdiction was upheld."
Id. The court then cited two pre-Shaffer cases. See Donald Manter Co. v. Davis, 543 F.2d 419 (1st
Cir. 1976); Nielsen v. Braand, 264 Minn. 481, 119 N.W.2d 737 (1963).
66. Blacketer, 86 Wis. 2d at 688, 273 N.W.2d at 287.
67. Id. at 688, 273 N.W.2d at 287.
68. 779 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1985).
69. Id. at 271.
70. Id. at 265.
71. Id. The district court found that "the rule of transient jurisdiction has suffered a fate akin
to that of... dinosaurs" and dismissed the action. Id. (citing Amusement Equip., Inc. v. Mordelt,
595 F. Supp. 125, 125 (E.D. La. 1984), rev'd, 779 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1985)). The Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit countered, "While Shaffer may have rendered the black letter gray, we do not
think the letter of the law has become so pale that it can be read only with conjurer's glasses." Id. at
268.
72. Mordelt, 779 F.2d at 268.
73. Id. at 270.
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ion over its territory and those within it. Fairness does not operate in a
vacuum. To abstract it from context and elevate it blindly over sover-
eign prerogatives is ultimately to free the individual from the obliga-
tions inherent in a statist system.74
The transient rule of jurisdiction has also been justified by the voluntary
nature of the nonresident defendant's entry into the forum state. In In Re Mar-
riage of Pridemore75 the Appellate Court for the Fourth District of Illinois held
jurisdiction proper over defendant personally served when he visited the forum
state to attend his parent's fiftieth wedding anniversary celebration. 76 The court
noted that defendant was not "induced by artifice, trick or fraud to enter the
State for the sole purpose of being served with process."'77 Hence the court reaf-
firmed the "long-standing principle that service of process on a nonresident per-
son who is physically present in the State, albeit briefly, is a sufficient basis for in
personam jurisdiction. '78
In Lockert the North Carolina Supreme Court relied on this latter line of
cases recognizing the transient rule of jurisdiction and opposing application of a
minimum contacts analysis to nonresident defendants served with process in the
forum state.79 Similarly, the court relied on several arguments including the
inherent fairness of serving process on a defendant who appears in the forum
state of his own volition,80 the traditional state sovereignty argument approved
in Pennoyer,8 1 and the absence of any explicit mandate by the United States
Supreme Court on the validity of the transient jurisdiction rule.8 2 Further, the
court cited Humphrey v. Langford,8 3 in which the Georgia Supreme Court pro-
vided additional "compelling reasons to uphold [transient] jurisdiction":8 4
We believe that it is not practical to have classifications of sojourners
in the state. Where does a court draw the line... ? Some individuals
are constant or perennial sojourners. Some have no identifiable place
of residence. Still others are able to avoid personal service by remain-
ing away from an otherwise identifiable place of abode. Others to
avoid a responsibility can terminate on a moment's notice a legal resi-
dence and otherwise disrupt the judicial process. Others can terminate
residence in a forum favorable to the plaintiff and establish residence in
a forum considered favorable to the defendant .... If they cannot be
sued where they are found, they may not be sued at all.85
This justification, coupled with the North Carolina Supreme Court's effort
74. Id.
75. 146 Il. App. 3d 990, 497 N.E.2d 818 (1986).
76. Id. at 991, 497 N.E.2d at 819.
77. Id. at 993, 497 N.E.2d at 820.
78. Id. at 992, 497 N.E.2d at 820.
79. Lockert, 321 N.C. at 69, 361 S.E.2d at 583.
80. Id. at 71, 361 S.E.2d at 585.
81. Id. at 69, 361 S.E.2d at 583.
82. Id. at 70-71, 361 S.E.2d at 584.
83. 246 Ga. 732, 273 S.E.2d 22 (1980). Defendant, a resident of South Carolina, went bowling
in Georgia and while there, was served with a summons and complaint. Id.
84. Id. at 734, 273 S.E.2d at 24.
85. Id.
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to read International Shoe and Shaffer as distinguishable alternatives for other
kinds of jurisdiction,8 6 allowed the court in Lockert to fashion narrowly a literal
interpretation of due process and widely miss the mark of fairness.
The court neither erred in its interpretation of Pennoyer nor misapplied the
law in the cases on which it relied. The validity of these cases, however, is ques-
tionable. Three decisions cited pre-Shaffer cases and either did not address
Shaffer or summarily dismissed the case in a cursory review.87 In Mordelt,88 for
example, the district court had argued that "[i]nsofar as the transient jurisdic-
tion doctrine runs afoul of the minimum contacts test.., the doctrine, and its
obsolete theoretical underpinnings, must give way." 8 9 The best argument the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit could muster against this
ruling was that neither International Shoe nor Shaffer involved service of process
within the state.90 Both Mordelt and Lockert further relied on Aluminal Indus-
tries, Inc v. Newtown Commercial Assocs.91 as post-Shaffer evidence "of contin-
uing validity of transient jurisdiction;" 92 Yet Aluminal relied largely on the pre-
Shaffer case Donald Manter Co. v. Davis.93 Subsequently, the Third Circuit dis-
approved of Aluminal because of its lack of analysis. 94 Lockert also referred to
Opert v. Schmid,95 in which the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York similarly, and without analysis, found that Shaffer was
inapplicable because it was not a case in which defendant was personally served
within the jurisdiction. 96 Arguably such authority falls short of strong, well-
reasoned support for transient jurisdiction.
Apart from claims that Shaffer must be read broadly and thatUnited States
Supreme Court silence could as easily be construed as approval of an all-inclu-
sive minimum contacts test after Shaffer, the most persuasive argument for ap-
plying a minimum contacts analysis to transient jurisdiction situations is the
inequitable result of not applying the analysis. The court in Pitman v. Typecraft
Software Ltd. highlighted the illogic of a transient jurisdiction rule without mini-
mum contacts limitation.97 The court convincingly identified the inconsistency
of requiring minimum contacts for in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction, but not
for in personam jurisdiction:
86. Lockert, 321 N.C. at 70, 361 S.E.2d at 584. The court stated that "[International Shoe] set
out an alternative means of establishing personal jurisdiction .... " Id.
87. See Amusement Equip., Inc. v. Mordelt, 779 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1985); Opert v. Schmid,
535 F. Supp. 591 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Aluminal Indus. v. Newtown Commercial Assocs., 89 F.R.D.
326 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
88. 779 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1985). For a discussion of Mordelt, see supra notes 68-74 and ac-
companying text.
89. Mordelt, 595 F. Supp. 125, 128 n.3 (E.D. La. 1984), rev'd, 779 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1985).
90. Mordelt, 779 F.2d at 268.
91. 89 F.R.D. 326 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
92. Mordelt, 779 F.2d at 268 n.8.
93. 543 F.2d 419 (1st Cir. 1976). For a discussion of Manter, see supra note 45.
94. See Nehemiah v. Athletics Congress of the U.S.A., 765 F.2d 42, 46 (3d Cir. 1985). For a
discussion of Nehemiah, see supra note 57.
95. 535 F. Supp. 591 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
96. Id. at 594.
97. 626 F. Supp. 305, 313 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
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Under Shaffer, a court may not sequester a defendant's property and
assert in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction unless there are minimum
contacts between the defendant, the litigation and the forum. Were the
court to hold that minimum contacts need not be present in the juris-
diction when served, the court would thereby accord less protection to
an individual defendant than to his or her property within the state.
Surely the Shaffer Court did not intend such an illogical and unfair
result.98
One commentator has argued that a nonresident defendant's presence in the
forum state should be only one factor in determining whether a court may exer-
cise in personam jurisdiction: "[I]f due process means fairness based on the
existence of minimum contacts ... it would appear that in personam jurisdic-
tion, grounded solely upon mere physical presence, is inconsistent with the hold-
ing in Shaffer. . .. "99
The result of such inherent unfairness is obvious. The recurrent charge is
that the transient rule of jurisdiction subjects defendants to suits in jurisdictions
where "no part of the operative facts occurred and in which neither of the par-
ties lives."' ' ° While plaintiffs' rights should be protected as well, the minimum
contacts test is uniquely concerned with a defendant's connection to the forum
state such that the maintenance of the suit does not violate those rights afforded
her under the due process clause. 10' Mere presence in a state does not answer
the International Shoe requirements of" 'fair play and substantial justice' "102
under the minimum contacts test and, without more, would often subject a de-
fendant to the burdens due process rights were specifically designed to guard
against.
Choice of law problems may further complicate litigation in a forum state
in which defendant's presence is the only connection. If the litigation results in
the application of a nonforum state's law, "the forum may not be 'in a favorable
position to deal intelligently either with the facts or with the law.' "o103 This
98. Id. The court added, "lTiransient jurisdiction may [also] constitute an unwarranted and
undesirable burden on commerce." Id.; see infra note 105 and accompanying text.
99. Bernstine, supra note 22, at 66. Bernstine offers the following example:
[I]t would be somewhat odd that a nonresident defendant, whose property is located in the
forum, would not be subject to jurisdiction there because his property does not give rise to
sufficient minimum contacts, while another nonresident defendant, who owns no property
in the forum, does no business in the state, and does not otherwise avail himself of the
state's benefits and protection, will nevertheless be subject to the court's jurisdiction merely
because of his transient presence.
Id.
100. W. COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BAsES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 100 (1942).
101. In International Shoe the Supreme Court stated:
[Mow that the capias ad respondendum has given way to personal service of summons or
other form of notice, due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a
judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have
certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
102. Id.
103. Ehrenzweig, supra note 3, at 290 (quoting Dodd, Jurisdiction in Personal Actions, 23 ILL. L.
REv. 427, 438 (1929)).
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argument prompted one commentator to suggest that the transient rule of juris-
diction, if not abolished, should at least be replaced by the doctrine of forum non
conveniens as a way of dealing with the inequities.'14 Absent such a bold move,
Shaffer must be read broadly, as it was intended, to ensure the fairness require-
ment is met in all exercises of state court jurisdiction.
In addition to the immediate impact of the rule of transient jurisdiction on
defendant's due process rights, Pitman suggested one further ramification of the
rule's use: it may "constitute an unwarranted and undesirable burden on com-
merce."105 Ironically, this burden would affect not only individuals who fear
becoming defendants in an inconvenient forum with which they have relatively
little contact, but also individuals or corporations seeking to do business with
residents outside their forum state. That a tangential relationship of mere pres-
ence in a state can serve as the basis for jurisdiction may produce a chilling effect
that far outweighs any "protection" the rule ostensibly affords to potential
plaintiffs.
A clear mandate from the United States Supreme Court on the status of the
transient rule of jurisdiction would be welcome. Barring such a ruling, however,
the Court's silence should not necessarily be construed as approval for a Pen-
noyer-based approach to jurisdiction, because the intervening years have pro-
duced numerous decisions casting doubt on the sovereignty justification for
personal service within the forum state without more. Legislative reform of the
statutes governing jurisdiction would likewise "minimize the problem by limit-
ing the choice of the forum on rational grounds to one having such contacts with
the case as will justify the application of the chosen forum's own law."' 1 6 How-
ever, the probability of such action is unlikely as long as courts uphold the erro-
neous assumption that transient jurisdiction is a valid exercise of state power.
Perhaps, as one commentator noted, the rule will be subsumed by its excep-
tions.'0 7 A more workable solution is for state courts to look beyond Pennoyer
and pre-Shaffer cases to the recent changes in and justifications for jurisdictional
basis. Courts should recognize that the rule's role has been limited to a factor in
determining the proper scope of in personam jurisdiction, and acknowledge the
applicability of the minimum contacts test so that the purpose of due process-
fairness to the parties-may be achieved.
The transient rule of jurisdiction, which arose out of Pennoyer, has never
104. See Berstine, supra note 22, at 66. In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947), the
Supreme Court stated the principle of forum non conveniens that "a court may resist imposition
upon its jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is authorized by the letter of a general venue statute."
Id. at 507.
105. 626 F. Supp. at 313.
106. Ehrenzweig, supra note 3, at 292.
107. Id. at 312. Ehrenzweig prophesied,
mhe transient rule... is most easily explainable as a relic of the Pennoyer rule which
declares [personal service within the state] to be required for the establishment of personaljurisdiction. Once this requirement, breaking down under an increasing number of "excep-
tions," ceases to be valid, its creature the transient rule may have reached the end of its
course and left the way open for a new approach, satisfying new needs.
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been aThrmed explicitly by the Supreme Court. Arguably, .the rule is no more
than a remnant of our historical and legal past, and the trend since International
Shoe and Shaffer away from the Pennoyer emphasis on state sovereignty, should
undermine support for continued application of the rule. If it is not obsolete, the
rule is at least contrary to due process; those courts that recognize transient
jurisdiction severely erode due process rights to which defendants are entitled.
The North Carolina Supreme Court in Lockert has chosen to perpetuate this
anomaly. In doing so, it has contravened directly the due process mandate of
International Shoe and Shaffer.
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